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Abstract: This essay re-reads early American sentimental novels (Charlotte Tem-
ple, The Coquette, Emily Hamilton) through the lens of contemporaneous Euro-
pean aesthetics (Baumgarten, Schiller) to argue that American writers’ anxieties
concerning the power of their work to either educate or deceive are more than
defensive responses to the novel’s detractors. These anxieties are real: they testi-
fy to concerns about the reliability of sensuous perception that also haunt early
European aestheticians. Once we realize this, we see that sentimental writers do
not, as major theorists of sentimentalism claim, unconditionally affirm the ex-
pression of feelings. Instead, they advocate what I call sympathy control.
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In 2009, the University of Nebraska Press published Sukey Vickery’s epistolary
novel Emily Hamilton (1803) in its “Legacies of Nineteenth-Century American
Women Writers” series.1 Edited and introduced by Scott Slawinski, the volume
comes as a very welcome addition to the corpus of early American novels. In
his introduction, Slawinski writes,
Vickery’s writings … reveal a deep commitment to a realistic view of the world and a
realist aesthetic in her work. While this reaches its highest achievement in Emily Hamil-
ton, one can see in her poetry an unflinching look at the world. … In her elegies, there
are no excessive calls for tears such as might be found in more sentimental poems.2
Slawinski takes his argument a decisive step further when he contends that the
recovery of Emily Hamilton may well prompt us to rewrite American literary his-
tory since Vickery’s novel, which was published in 1803 and thus over half a
century before realism begins in standard U.S. literary histories, is already char-
acterized by a serious “commitment to a realist aesthetic”.3 Slawinski then
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proceeds to a comparison of Emily Hamilton to Henry James’ The Portrait of a
Lady, concluding that “[e]ven William Dean Howells, the Dean of American
Realism, might have appreciated Vickery’s efforts, though perhaps not the final
product”.4
Slawinski’s claims deserve a closer look, for several reasons. First of all,
pace Slawinski’s (however cautious) comparisons of Emily Hamilton to texts by
major realist writers, Vickery’s novel displays neither the deft colloquialism of
Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn; nor the descriptive detail of
Sarah Orne Jewett’s regionalist short stories; nor the psychological realism of
Henry James’ prose; nor William Dean Howells’ dissection of middle-class anxi-
eties; nor Dreiser’s hard-hitting social realism. Some of the differences are due
to Emily Hamilton’s epistolary form, but in the final analysis, Vickery simply
has not written a realist text – neither in terms of style nor subject matter.
In fact, Emily Hamilton is in most respects a perfectly conventional senti-
mental novel. Apart from the keepsake motif, all major elements of the senti-
mental mode are present: the centrality of courtship, marriage, and female
friendship; the sanctity of affective relationships, especially the mother-daugh-
ter bond; an abundance of teary scenes; characters’ moral lecturing; a seduction
plot; the ideal of love marriage; the allegorical mode; encomiums of pastoral
life, domesticity, and charity; and deathbed scenes that fit in with sentimental-
ism’s exceptionally strong concern with human finitude. In short, Emily Hamil-
ton is as sentimental a novel as it gets.
Yet Slawinski does make a valid point when he writes that while Emily Ha-
milton contains emotionally charged and tearful scenes, Vickery’s readers are
also “presented with young women who meet [emotional] challenges rationally
and effectively rather than with overflowing and sustained grief”.5 The epon-
ymous protagonist is especially adept at keeping her emotions in check. When
Emily fears for the life of ailing Edward Belmont, an unhappily married man
whose love for her she cannot reciprocate for fear of public disgrace, she hides
her anguish when in company, “wear[ing] the smile of satisfaction on [her]
countenance” as she “disguise[s]” her “real sentiments”.6 The earlier Letter
XXXV, which Emily writes to her friend Mary Gray, presents a veritable case
study of one woman’s strenuous efforts to rein in her feelings and her passion.
When she discovers that the man whom she fell in love with when he saved her
from drowning is a married man, her romantic fantasies are cut short. She faints
and is deeply distraught when she comes to her senses again. Yet just as
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quickly, she forms a resolution: “To see him before I had acquired strength or
reason to conceal those emotions the sight of him had occasioned, I could by
no means bear to think of”.7 Intent on “disguis[ing] the real sentiments of [her]
heart” should she see him again, Emily resolves to restrain her emotions and
desires even more forcefully: “I determined if possible to extricate myself from a
passion, which could only be productive of guilt and wretchedness, if it were
indulged”.8 In responding to Emily, Mary encourages her to stay the course of
self-restraint: “You are endeavoring to overcome affection by reason, and you
will undoubtedly succeed in time; but remember, my dear girl, matters of im-
portance, are not often executed in a day”.9
On the face of it, Emily’s resolution and her friend’s advice fit squarely into
the moral universe of sentimental fiction, where pre-marital dalliances spell
doom for heroines. However, the two women’s forceful conviction that untimely
passions and emotions, including Emily’s sympathy for the ailing Belmont,
must be concealed immediately and suppressed by exertions of reason in due
course must strike those acquainted with scholarship on sentimentalism since
Jane Tompkins’ Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction,
1790–1860 (1985) as running counter to some of the revisionist critics’ most
deeply held convictions about sentimental fiction.10 Our two characters’ insis-
tence on the need for emotional self-restraint does not sit easily with these scho-
lars’ argument that the cultural work sentimental novels do crucially depends
on their valorization of openly expressed emotions. After all, one of the pro-
claimed aims of revisionist scholarship is to reverse the judgments implied by
dictionary definitions of ‘sentimentalism’ as “the disposition to attribute undue
importance to sentimental considerations, or to be governed by sentiment in
opposition to reason; the tendency to excessive indulgence in or insincere dis-
play of sentiment”.11 As Tompkins, Judith Fetterley, Cathy N. Davidson, Joanne
Dobson, Shirley Samuels, and others have argued, sentimentalism’s emotional
appeals have a political valence.12 Far from merely pandering to their readers’
affective needs, sentimental writers highlight the tearful anguish of innocent
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characters for the purpose of cultural critique. By establishing strong emotional
bonds between readers and characters that suffer at the hands of the dominant
culture, they elicit our sympathy for socially marginalized groups and our moral
outrage at their plight: that of unmarried women in Hannah Webster Foster’s
The Coquette (1797); that of displaced Native Americans in Lydia Huntley Si-
gourney’s poem “The Cherokee Mother” (1831); and that of African-American
slaves in the case of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852).13
For Slawinski, it is primarily Vickery’s refusal to let her characters give un-
restrained expression to their emotions that testifies to Emily Hamilton’s renun-
ciation of sentimentalism and its “carefully planned realism”:14
Once Emily unwittingly falls in love with a married man, a significant portion of the
novel is dedicated to the illustration of her struggle to overcome her emotions rather
than to the exploration of following the dictates of passion blindly – a significant break
with other, more popular novels of the period. Structuring her book around this conflict
allows Vickery to display her inner mental and emotional strength, ultimately developing
an early strain of psychological realism that matured in novels by antebellum women
and Nathaniel Hawthorne as well as in those by Henry James.15
Citing Davidson and Fetterley, Slawinski refers to revisionist scholarship on sen-
timentalism even as his determination to ‘rescue’ Emily Hamilton from being
pigeon-holed as a sentimental novel reveals that his judgment of sentimentalism
is ultimately more in accord with dictionary definitions of the term. While I can-
not see why creating a literary character who struggles “to overcome her emo-
tions” should by necessity be more realistic, let alone more realist, than creating
one who “follow[s] the dictates of passion blindly”, it is clear that Slawinski
considers Emily Hamilton a (proto-)realist novel because it disavows what he
considers the emotional excesses of sentimentalism.
I am less concerned with Slawinski’s negative appraisal of the sentimental
(here I side with revisionist scholarship). The point I wish to make is that a
writer’s decision not to let her characters give full expression to their emotional
states makes a novel neither more realist nor less sentimental. In point of fact,
what Slawinski observes is by no means a deviation from sentimental formulae.
In classic works of U.S. sentimental fiction such as William Hill Brown’s The

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Power of Sympathy, Susanna Rowson’s Charlotte Temple, and Foster’s The Co-
quette, narrators, characters, and implied authors alike regularly suggest that
unrestrained indulgence in fellow-feeling is harmful and must be checked by
the power of reason.16 What I call sympathy control is an integral part of the
sentimental tradition.
In Rowson’s novel, Charlotte Temple’s mother forms a remarkable resolu-
tion when she learns of her daughter’s elopement. Stricken with grief, she deter-
mines to smile in the face of adversity:
I will endeavour to appear more cheerful, and by appearing in some measure to have
conquered my own sorrow, alleviate the sufferings of my husband, and rouse him from
that torpor into which this misfortune has plunged him. My father too demands my care
and attention: I must not, by a selfish indulgence of my own grief, forget the interest
those two dear objects take in my happiness or misery: I will wear a smile on my face,
though the thorn rankles in my heart ….17
Rowson’s narrator explicitly sanctions and applauds the mother’s decision to
dissimulate her feelings: “Thus argued this excellent woman: and in the execu-
tion of so laudable a resolution we shall leave her”.18 Near the ending of Fos-
ter’s The Coquette, we encounter a similar case of sympathy control when Julia
Granby, who has just learned that her friend Eliza Wharton was debauched by
Major Sanford, does her best to conceal her anguish over Eliza’s despair when
talking to her friend’s mother: “I was obliged studiously to suppress even my
thoughts concerning her, lest the emotions they excited might be observed”.19
Perhaps, such paeans to sympathy control appear less out of sync with senti-
mentalism’s strong emotional appeals when we remind ourselves that The
Power of Sympathy, the title of the text that is generally considered the first
American sentimental novel, most immediately refers to two siblings’ near-in-
cestuous desire for one another. Neither this novel nor those that follow it advo-
cate any unconditional surrender to the power of sympathy.
In all these novels, character’s decisions to rein in their sympathy for the
suffering of others are well motivated on the diegetic level. The eponymous her-
oine of Emily Hamilton seeks to control her passion for Belmont and hide her
distress over his ill health (and thus also her sympathy in its full etymological

16 William Hill Brown, The Power of Sympathy, in The Power of Sympathy and The Coquette,
ed. William S. Osborne (1789; reprint, Schenectady: New College & UP, 1970); Susanna Rowson,
Charlotte Temple, ed. Cathy N. Davidson (1791; reprint, New York: Oxford UP, 1987); and Foster,
The Coquette.
17 Rowson, Charlotte Temple, 56.
18 Rowson, Charlotte Temple, 56–57.
19 Foster, The Coquette, 144.
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sense, i.e., her suffering with another) because she cannot publicly express her
love for a married man. While Emily Hamilton’s determination to check her
emotions is largely dictated by social conventions, Charlotte Temple’s mother’s
decision “to wear a smile on my face, though the thorn rankles in my heart” is
motivated by a sense of responsibility toward fellow family members: she con-
trols her sympathy for Charlotte out of sympathy for her father’s and her hus-
band’s suffering. In The Coquette, Julia Granby’s decision to conceal her an-
guish over ‘ruined’ Eliza appears to be motivated by a combination of societal
and interpersonal concerns: she neither wants to expose her friend to the social
consequences of her transgression, nor does she want to burden Eliza’s mother
with the knowledge of that transgression since this would, Julia fears, “break
her widowed heart” (143).
In all three novels, then, there are good reasons why characters keep their
feelings for others in check. And “reasons” is indeed the operative word, since
sentimental writers regularly attribute their characters’ decisions not to let
themselves be carried away by their emotions to the dictates of reason. Thus,
when Emily Hamilton despairs over Belmont’s medical condition, she chides
herself for her inability to exert full rational control over her inner turmoil: “I
was once firm, I did not suffer my spirits to be depressed, but now, instead of
endeavoring to overcome my sorrows by reason and reflection, I yield to its [sic]
pressure and almost sink beneath it”.20 When Charlotte Temple resolves to re-
ject Montraville’s entreaties to elope with him to the other side of the Atlantic
and return to her parents instead (a resolution that she will soon break), Char-
lotte exults, “How shall I rejoice … in this triumph of reason over inclination”.21
In The Coquette, too, characters strive for the “triumph of reason over inclina-
tion”. It is not only the temperate Rev. Boyer who “hope[s]” and “trust[s]” that
he “ever shall be a reasonable creature; and not suffer [his] judgment to be mis-
led by the operations of a blind passion”.22 Mrs. Richman’s advice to Eliza
Wharton rests on the very same hierarchy between reason and feeling: “O my
cousin, beware of the delusions of fancy! Reason must be our guide, if we
would expect durable happiness”.23
Sympathy control by way of reason is an integral aspect of sentimental no-
vels that both their detractors and, more central to my argument, their revisionist
defenders ignore. Given this lacuna in current scholarship, standard revisionist
accounts of sentimental writing as “premised on an emotional and philosophical
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ethos that celebrates human connection, both personal and communal, and ac-
knowledges the shared devastation of affectional loss” need to be revisited to
take account of the fact that the characters, narrators, and implied authors of
sentimental writing regularly advocate not the full expression of inner states but
‘reasonable’ emotional restraint.24 Sentimental fiction neither unequivocally “af-
firms an embodied, affective personhood”, nor does it derive all of its political
force from its attempts to render “the feelings in the story … tangibly present in
the flesh of the reader”.25 Instead, both the characters and the implied readers of
sentimental fiction are ultimately modeled on a modern, enlightened notion of
the subject as capable of counterbalancing feeling by reason. Sentimental litera-
ture is in line with Enlightenment thought not only in the sense that it pits, as
Cathy N. Davidson and Jay Fliegelman already observed in the 1980s, female
subjects’ striving for liberty against the old, republican-patriarchal order.26 Senti-
mental literature is also enlightened in its anthropological outlook.
When the first sentimental American novels were published, Scottish com-
mon sense philosophy dominated academic philosophy in the U.S. and was
widely disseminated in periodicals.27 Perry Miller goes as far as pronouncing
Scottish philosophy “the official metaphysics of America” during the first half
of the nineteenth century.28 As Gregg Camfield has shown, Scottish thinkers
such as Hugh Blair and Archibald Alison greatly influenced Harriet Beecher
Stowe when she wrote Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), ultimately prompting her to
opt for an “emotional antirationalism”.29
While Camfield’s reading of Uncle Tom’s Cabin is as powerful as it is deba-
table, the earlier sentimental novels that I am concerned with most certainly do
not throw reason to the wind. In insisting that feeling needs to be counterba-
lanced by reason, texts such as The Power of Sympathy, Charlotte Temple, The
Coquette, and Emily Hamilton subscribe to a view of human nature that is, in
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fact, closer to that which underlies a continental European thinker’s major trea-
tise on art than to Scottish common sense philosophers’ understanding of
‘man’. In his twenty-seven letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), the
German dramatist, poet, and philosopher Friedrich Schiller develops an aes-
thetic theory that is based on an Enlightenment anthropology which tempers
Immanuel Kant’s ethical rigor by stressing that the moral law cannot be im-
posed on human beings against their inclination.30 As do sentimental writers,
Schiller suggests that the morality of human behavior cannot be grounded so-
lely in the demands of reason but must be supported by feelings and subjective
dispositions. At the same time, Schiller does not agree with Scottish common
sense philosophers that feeling is a safe guide to rational behavior. Instead, he
speaks of the need to reconcile and balance reason and feeling. And this is pre-
cisely what we also find in sentimental sympathy control.
That the anthropology which informs late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century sentimental novels published in the United States is closer to that
which underlies a continental European thinker’s aesthetic theory than to that
propounded by Scottish common sense philosophers – who, unlike Schiller,
were widely read in the early republic31 – may come as less of a surprise if we
consider the origin of ‘aesthetics’ in eighteenth-century German philosophy.
When the term was first introduced in 1735, it meant “the science of sensuous
perception” or “the science of sensuous cognition”.32 Coined and first defined
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by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in his M.A. Thesis Meditationes philosophicae
de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735), and expanded on in his two-volume
Aesthetica (1750/1758), the new ‘science’ of aesthetics quickly took hold in the
German-speaking world.33 Immanuel Kant based his lectures on metaphysics on
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739), which contains his earlier definition of aes-
thetics, draws on Baumgarten’s theory of sensuous cognition in the second edi-
tion of his Critique of Pure Reason, and critically engages with him in his own
aesthetic theory, Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790).34 Thus, from its begin-
nings, continental European aesthetics has centrally revolved around questions
of aisthēsis (sensation, sense perception, feeling) – the very questions that are
also at the heart of sentimental novels.
Writing against the background of a French Revolution that had devolved
into terreur, Schiller considers the experience of freedom in the world of aesthetic
semblance a necessary training that prepares human beings for the political free-
dom the Enlightenment project envisages: “[I]t is only through Beauty that man
makes his way to Freedom”.35 Contrary to Schiller, early American sentimental
writers seem to have little faith in their readers’ ability freely to channel their
aesthetic experience in socially useful ways. As Emily Hamilton’s, Charlotte Tem-
ple’s, and Eliza Wharton’s examples demonstrate, human beings are so prone to
be swayed by their feelings that they need guidance in regulating their affective
economy. Sentimental novelists resort to didacticism as one of the staple techni-
ques of the subgenre to ensure that our sympathy attaches itself to the right char-
acters. To give but one example: in the case of Charlotte Temple, the motherly
narrator reminds us that the death of Mademoiselle La Rue – the novel’s emo-
tionally manipulative schoolmistress, who convinces Charlotte to elope with her
seducer and thus precipitates Charlotte’s ruin – is “a striking example that vice,
however prosperous in the beginning, in the end leads only to misery and
shame”.36 Keenly aware of the power of emotional appeals – both by the novel
itself and its villainous characters – Rowson’s didacticism aims at enabling her
readers to achieve a certain distance from a purely affective experience of the
text, thus immunizing them against emotional manipulation and deception.
In Schiller’s model of aesthetic education, any such determination of the
reader’s response interferes with the educational function of art. As a matter of

Karlheinz Barck, Dieter Kliche, & Jörg Heininger, “Ästhetik/ästhetisch”, Ästhetische Grundbe-
griffe, ed. Karlheinz Barck et al, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000) 326.
33 See Baumgarten, Meditationes; and Aesthetica.
34 See Barck, Kliche, & Heininger 2000, 324.
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fact, Schiller explicitly defines his notion of aesthetic education against didactic
art: “Not less self-contradictory”, Schiller writes, “is the notion of a fine art
which teaches (didactic) or improves (moral); for nothing is more at variance
with the concept of beauty than the notion of giving the psyche any definite
bias”.37 Schiller’s strictures against didactic art resonate with Immanuel Kant’s
assertion that art allows for the free play of the faculties.38 Yet Schiller’s aver-
sion to didacticism is most firmly grounded in his anthropology. Schiller consid-
ers human beings to be possessed of a dual nature. Two drives are at war within
us: the ‘material’ or ‘sensuous drive’ (Stofftrieb) makes us receptive to the de-
mands of external reality and strives for ever new sensory input; the ‘formal
drive’ or ‘form-drive’ (Formtrieb) seeks to impose order and give a shape to the
world and the self. In its passivity, the sensuous drive is linked to sense, sensa-
tion, and feeling, while the formal drive is linked to reason, understanding, and
the law. For Schiller, human beings are whole only if the two drives balance
each other out, and he postulates a third drive, the play drive (Spieltrieb), that
continually plays the other two drives off against one another:
Reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: Let there be a bond of
union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say, let there be a play-
drive, since only the union of reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity
with freedom, makes the concept of human nature complete.39
This play drive, Schiller adds, is activated in the presence of beauty in general
and the fine arts in particular. Thus, it is in the experience of art that human
beings may live the fullness of their existence:
[S]ince in the enjoyment of beauty, or aesthetic unity, an actual union and interchange
between matter and form, passivity and activity, momentarily takes place, the compat-
ibility of our two natures, the practicability of the infinite being realized in the finite,
hence the possibility of sublimest humanity, is thereby actually proven.40
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As do sentimental writers in their emotional appeals, Schiller seeks to temper
the kind of ethical rigor Kant demands by stressing that the moral law cannot
be imposed on human beings against their inclination; it must be grounded in
their affective experience of the world. For Kant as for Schiller, human perfec-
tion is moral perfection and “beauty” is, in Kant’s words, “the symbol of the
morally good” in the sense that it allows us to become “aware of a certain en-
noblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from sensible
impressions, and also esteems the value of others in accordance with a similar
maxim of their power of judgment”.41 But Schiller adds that this human ideal
can be reached only when “reason and the senses, duty and inclination, are in
harmony”.42 Thus, the freedom Schiller speaks of when, in his Kallias letters, he
defines beauty as “freedom in appearance”,43 is the free interplay of sensuous-
ness and reason. In allowing for human beings’ self-realization, aesthetic ex-
perience can pave the way to freedom since by balancing out the demands of
the sensuous and the formal drive, of feeling and reason, it liberates us from
being determined by either. Thus, it is aesthetic education that prepares indivi-
dual human beings for the free society the Kantian Enlightenment promises,
but in its appeal to only the rational nature of human beings cannot realize.44
While Schiller and sentimental American novelists both stress the moral
productivity of emotions, they seem to draw up two very different maps of the
relationships between art, its recipients, and the world. For Rowson and her
fellow sentimental writers, literature educates its readers by way of emotional
appeals and moral instruction. By way of contrast, Schiller’s program of aes-
thetic education to human autonomy and freedom functions precisely in the
absence of such determinations. Yet once we take a closer look at early senti-
mental novels, we discover that their anthropology as well as their models of
aesthetic education are closer to Schiller’s than appears at first sight.
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Bringing late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American writers of
sentimental fiction into a dialogue with contemporaneous European aestheti-
cians such as Baumgarten and Schiller helps us understand the extent to which
American writers’ anxieties concerning the power of their work to either educate
or lead astray and deceive its readers are more than defensive (or disingenuous)
responses to the detractors of the novel, who disdained literature for its lack of
moral or religious rectitude.45 These anxieties are real in the sense that they
bear witness to more broadly based concerns about the reliability of sensuous
perception that haunt early American novelists as much as they do early Eur-
opean aestheticians. For a thinker such as Baumgarten, to devote books to the
study of sensuous cognition around 1750 is a daring project that still cannot
quite shake off doubts concerning its own legitimacy. Baumgarten himself in-
herits the rationalist tradition via Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff,
and he situates himself within it when he asserts that sensory perception allows
us to know things clearly but also confusedly (clara et confusa), i.e., without the
conceptual distinctness of reason – which alone allows for cognition distin-
guished by “claritatis intensio per distinctionem” (clarity intensified by distinct-
ness).46 Within Baumgarten’s rationalist epistemology, only the conceptual ap-
paratus of reason can give us access to the perfect distinctness of universal
forms. Baumgarten’s choice to accord the human senses their own place vis-à-
vis rational cognition must be appreciated with these doubts concerning the re-
liability of human perception in mind.47
Even in Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, which constitutes one
of the most ringing defenses of art and the artistic imagination at the end of the
century, we can still detect traces of the rationalist mistrust in the senses. While
he celebrates the reconciliation of the receptive sensuous drive and the law-giv-
ing form-drive in the experience of art as a supreme expression of human free-
dom, he occasionally subordinates sensibility to reason when he insists that
aesthetic experience serves a transitional function by leading human beings
from sensuousness to rationality: “Our psyche passes, then, from sensation to
thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at
the same time”.48 In continental Europe at least, early aesthetics remains
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wedded to a belief in human rationality that tends to subordinate sensibility to
reason. For early aestheticians, sensuous perception is both an indispensible
and an imperfect guide to knowledge.
Both early European aestheticians and early American writers, then, valor-
ize our sensual encounter of the world even as they register the fallibility of
sensuous cognition. Just as our senses can always deceive us, art – which con-
tains and mediates sensuous perception – can trick us. American novelists’ sus-
picions that deception may not only be a relevant subject matter for their work
but its very modus operandi becomes especially apparent in the case of senti-
mental fiction, whose power to move its readers revolves centrally around aisth-
ēsis. If we focus on the senses in this sense – as corporeal, sensuous experience
– we see that sentimental writers do not, as has been claimed by major theorists
of sentimentalism, unconditionally affirm the expression of feelings. The link
between continental European aesthetics and American sentimentalism is not
as direct as Elizabeth Maddock Dillon suggests:
Aesthetics aims at producing feeling subjects who, insofar as they feel, are able to un-
derstand their own subjectivity as free – personal, unconditioned, and creative. It is the
subjective feeling of freedom and personhood that eighteenth-century aesthetic theory
links to the ideal of human freedom and the (putatively) universal rights of man that are
central to liberal political theory. In related terms, sentimentalism links the capacity of
individuals to feel deeply (often, to suffer) to an essential, shared humanity.49
Neither Kant’s nor Schiller’s aesthetics, which Dillon adduces as examples of
her claims in the following paragraphs, “ai[m] at producing feeling subjects”.
Instead, they strive for and advocate a reconciliation of feeling and reason that
has its analogue in sentimental sympathy control.
This take on the intertwinement of aesthetics and sentimentalism helps us
explain why not only earlier texts such as Charlotte Temple and Foster’s The
Coquette but also later, supposedly proto-realist works such as Emily Hamilton
firmly belong to the sentimental tradition. All of these novels testify to a major
problem inherent in the affective economy of sentimentalism. For all of senti-
mentalism’s claims to authenticity and truthfulness, the success of its emotional
appeals does not depend on the veracity of the feelings that trigger processes of
sympathetic identification. This problem – the problem that faked emotional
distress can call forth heartfelt sympathy – haunts sentimentalism. Consider
Charlotte Temple, which never affirms emotional expressiveness unequivocally.
Instead, it negotiates a problem at the heart of sentimentalism. It is in line with
early American novels’ near-obsessive concerns about the ever-present possibi-
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lity of deception that Rowson’s novel repeatedly warns its readers that feelings
may be dissimulated. La Rue is the master dissimulator whose displays of emo-
tion are repeatedly qualified as false and staged. When, returning with La Rue
from a garden party that deeply offended Charlotte’s sense of propriety, Charlot-
te suggests that the school’s headmistress would have strongly disapproved of
their presence at the party, La Rue paints the consequences of letting the head-
mistress know in the darkest colors:
“Nay, Miss”, said La Rue, “perhaps your mighty sense of propriety may lead you to tell
her yourself. … Perhaps it will give you pleasure”, continued she, letting fall some hypo-
critical tears, “to see me deprived of bread, and for an action which by the most rigid
could only be esteemed an inadvertency, lose my place and character, and be driven
again into the world, where I have already suffered all the evils attendant on poverty”.50
While La Rue’s fears concerning her position at the school may be entirely justi-
fied and sincere, her tears are qualified as “hypocritical” and thus fake. La Rue
plays upon Charlotte’s feelings and instrumentalizes the power of sympathy to
further her own illicit ends. Such stratagems are a recurrent feature in early
sentimental novels. In The Coquette, the rakish Major Sanford throws himself at
Eliza Wharton’s feet and gushes forth “a flood of tears” that is designed to di-
vert his victim’s affections away from the honorable (but boring) Reverend Boy-
er.51 In censuring the rakish Mr. Lambert, Emily Hamilton provides a proto-fem-
inist perspective on seducers’ artful manipulations of their victims’ feelings:
“[Y]our sex are constantly using the meanest artifices, to delude those whose
youth or inexperience prevent them from perceiving the fatal snare which is laid
for them, till they are entangled in it”.52
In Charlotte Temple, La Rue is successful because she “was touching Char-
lotte in the most vulnerable part” – her heart.53 Such scenes raise a crucial pro-
blem for novels whose whole affective economy and educational function seem
based entirely on the possibility of sympathetic identification. If dissimulated
feelings can provoke real emotional responses within fictional space, what
guarantee is there that sentimental readers are not subjected to the same ma-
nipulation of their feelings? Sentimental novels repeatedly prove wrong one
character’s assertion in The Power of Sympathy that “[i]n the feelings of the
heart there can be no dissimulation”.54 Inadvertently, perhaps, sentimental wri-
ters evoke one of the major charges detractors of sentimental literature lay at its
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feet: that it deals in false emotions that manipulate its readers’ feelings. For
early American novelists, this presented an especially formidable challenge
since they also had to contend with the powerful anti-fiction movement that
was grounded in the Scottish common sense idea that truthfulness was a cen-
tral human virtue.55
To perceive how Charlotte Temple negotiates that problem, we need to shift
our attention away from its eponymous protagonist and toward one of the no-
vel’s minor characters. In Rowson’s fictional world, it is Mrs. Beauchamp, Char-
lotte’s benevolent and charitable friend, who serves as a model of ideal human-
ity. Unlike Charlotte, Mrs. Beauchamp is able to exert some form of control over
her emotional life without suppressing her sensuous nature. The “most compas-
sionate glance” Mrs. Beauchamp casts at Charlotte upon their first encounter
already testifies to the latter.56 Yet while it is her compassion that sanctifies
Mrs. Beauchamp, it is not her fellow feeling that distinguishes her from the
other characters. It is the fact that her acts of kindness are based on conscious
decisions rather than on irresistible calls from the heart. Thus, when she learns
of Charlotte’s distress, she does not immediately follow her inclination to call
on her. Instead, she considers how her neighbors would judge her visit to the
house of a fallen woman: “Dear sufferer”, she says half to herself, half to Char-
lotte, “how gladly would I pour into your heart the balm of consolation, were it
not for the fear of derision”.57 Only once she discloses to her husband her desire
to pay her distraught neighbor a visit and receives his approbation does Mrs.
Beauchamp “resolve to brave even the scoffs of the world”.58
At first sight, we might interpret Mrs. Beauchamp’s delayed response to
Charlotte’s signals of distress as signs of her moral timidity and lack of autono-
my. Yet this is clearly not the preferred reading. After all, by writing that Mrs.
Beauchamp “resolve[d] to brave even the scoffs of the world” (my emphasis),
Rowson stresses both the formidable power of public opinion Mrs. Beauchamp’s
plan comes up against and that, in the end, it was her decision, not her hus-
band’s, to put the plan into practice. Rather than letting her mind be ruled en-
tirely by her heart, she considers the possible consequences of her actions, gets
a second opinion, and only then makes an informed decision.
It is precisely that interposition of a moment of rational deliberation and
consultation that sets Mrs. Beauchamp’s actions apart from Charlotte’s and pre-
vents her from plunging headfirst into emotionally devastating situations. Con-
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versely, Charlotte’s fate is sealed by her inability to achieve any kind of distance
from her affective experience. Charlotte is an easy prey for Montraville, La Rue,
and Belcour because her sensuous nature is developed to such an extent that
she remains an almost entirely passive recipient of the sensory data that keeps
coming at her. As she writes in a letter to her mother, she has “a young heart
glowing with sensibility”.59 Unable to distinguish between being and appear-
ance, artifice and honesty, she believes that the force of her own emotional re-
sponse to Montraville’s love letters or La Rue’s protestations of friendship is
sufficient proof of her antagonists’ sincerity. Charlotte is all feeling and little
reason and as such unable to exert rational control over her emotions. In her
own words, she “never once reflected that the man who could stoop to seduc-
tion, would not hesitate to forsake the wretched object of his passion”.60
So while Charlotte responds passively to others’ appeals to her heart, Mrs.
Beauchamp translates her sympathetic response to Charlotte’s plight into ration-
ally informed decisions. In this, she approaches Schiller’s ideal human being
whose freedom and autonomy is guaranteed by a harmonious interplay of feel-
ing and reason. In early American novels, we frequently encounter such figures.
In The Coquette, it is Rev. Boyer and Mrs. Richman – admittedly less attractive
characters than Mrs. Beauchamp – who most closely resemble that ideal. As
Boyer puts it in a letter to Eliza, “The regard which I felt for you was tender and
animated, but it was not of that passionate kind which ends in death or despair.
It was governed by reason, and had a nobler object in view, than mere sensual
gratification”.61 Yet in my reading of Charlotte Temple, Mrs. Beauchamp is more
than a character in a novel, she is also the figure of the reader in the text. Her
sensuous-rational response to Charlotte’s fate provides a model for a reading of
early sentimental novels that has little need of didactic guidance because its
aesthetic experience does not exhaust itself in sympathetic identification. Such
a reading is enlightened in the sense that our feeling and our reason are en-
gaged in it in equal measure to ensure that we are not determined by either.
This returns us to the major problem registered by the affective economy of
sentimentalism. If, as La Rue’s example suggests, feelings can be dissimulated
to manipulate others’ emotional responses, how can we – as readers of senti-
mental novels – be sure that we are not manipulated in the same way? In other
words, if sentimental novels thematize, as Davidson argues, “the necessity of
informed choice” in matters of matrimony and sexuality,62 how can sentimental
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writers ensure that their primary readership – young, unmarried women like
Charlotte – actually has a choice given that it is assaulted by the novels’ power-
ful emotional appeals and didactic intent? From the perspective of Schiller’s
aesthetics, literary didacticism and appeals to the reader’s emotions alone are
unlikely to produce an enlightened citizenry that freely aligns its actions with
the moral law.
My contention is that Mrs. Beauchamp functions as an aperture for an alter-
native reading of early sentimental novels that manages to disengage itself from
the force of these texts’ emotional appeals and didactic intents. Responding to
these novels as Mrs. Beauchamp responds to Charlotte, readers may experience
something of the autonomy and self-determination Enlightenment thinkers
champion. Thus, readers of sentimental novels are educated in ways that immu-
nizes them against emotional manipulation without recourse to the stock
phrases of literary didacticism. Rowson’s decision to name her model character
Mrs. Beauchamp is therefore entirely appropriate. Its literal translation, ‘beauti-
ful field’, aligns her not only with the countryside as the preferred space in the
republican imagination; it aligns her also with the realm of beauty that the ar-
tistic imagination opens up. As we enter that realm, Schiller maintains, the pres-
sures of the empirical world lose their hold over us so that we can experience
the fullness of our humanity and, by extension, something of the freedom that
the Enlightenment promises.
Sentimental sympathy control must be understood in this trans-Atlantic
context, where American literary production in the early republic and early Eur-
opean theorizations of art meet. Reading a novel such as Emily Hamilton from
this vantage point allows us to understand that Sukey Vickery’s decision not to
let her characters give full rein to their emotions does not testify, as Slawinski
claims, to Emily Hamilton’s realism, just as sympathy control in other sentimen-
tal novels such as The Power of Sympathy, The Coquette, and Charlotte Temple
does not testify to these texts’ realist aesthetic. Bringing together early European
aesthetics and contemporaneous American literary production allows us to see
that sympathy control is an integral part of a sentimental aesthetics that is
grounded in an Enlightenment anthropology that radiates across the Atlantic.
This anthropology does not valorize unrestrained emotionality; instead, it sug-
gests that only the reconciliation of reason and feeling – a reconciliation that
may well necessitate the concealment and even suppression of particularly
powerful emotions – can pave the way to liberty. This may not be an especially
appealing view of human nature, partly because it does not chime easily with
the political force revisionist scholars attribute to sentimental emotions. But it is
that which early sentimental novels ultimately advocate.
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